Спасибо, не надо: Проведение мегамероприятий (Олимпиады, Чемпионат мира по футболу) — Часть 2

автор: Денис Песков

В своей новой колонке в Forbes'e о книгах центральной стала рецензия о "Большом цирке", или о том, что на самом деле означает почетное право проведения Олимпиад и Чемпионатов мира по футболу. Понятное дело, множество фактов и исследований в ревю не вошло. Если вам интересно узнать, почему их проведение в вашем городе или стране — тухлое предложение (а заодно и понять, почему западные города один за другим отказываются ввязываться в этот лохотрон, предлагая банковать диктаторам и странам в ситуациях "утрём нос соседям"), то милости прошу почитать мой пост с расширенными цитатами из этой полезнейшей книги. Не ленитесь вчитываться, — что не абзац, то "абзац". В оригинале все тезисы подкреплены ссылками, которые я тут приводить не стал. Если возникнет потребность — дайте знать.

Вчера мы изучали, как Олимпиады докатились до жизни такой. Как вы помните, первый серьезный коммерческий успех пришёл к современным Играм (после нескольких подряд провальных или скандальных) лишь в Лос-Анджелесе, который был ЕДИНСТВЕННЫМ кандидатом на проведение Олимпиады 1984. Это вновь разожгло аппетит остальных.

The Olympics were ascendant again, and aspiring host cities were springing up around the globe. The number of applicants went from one in the case of Los Angeles (to which the games were awarded in May 1978) and two in the case of Seoul (awarded in September 1981) to six in the case of Barcelona (awarded in October 1986), six in Atlanta (awarded in September 1990), eight in Sydney (awarded in September 1993), and eleven in Athens (awarded in September 1997).”
Борьба и расходы (в т.ч. подковёрные) за право проведения пошли вверх по спирали:

“Subsequent testimony and written evidence showed that this limit was surpassed in spades. Relatives of IOC members had received approximately $400,000 in financial aid or scholarships in a program that began after 1991, when Salt Lake City lost its bid to host the 1998 Winter Olympics.”
В цивилизованной Японии СОЖГЛИ бухгалтерскую отчётность по итогам Игр в Нагано 1998!
“The journalists were told that the Nagano committee had ordered its ninety-volume accounting books to be burned”
“the day before Sydney's election, the Australian bid committee had offered $50,000 scholarships to the children of the Ugandan and Kenyan members of the IOC. Sydney won its selection by two votes.”

Вчера, я упомянул истинную причину развода Зимних и Летних олимпиад по годам. В ФИФА тоже мастаки менять правила игры, если игра по их правилам чего-то не идёт:

“It was South America's turn to host the 2014 finals, but when the World Cup was awarded in October 2007, there was only one bidder from the continent, Brazil. Without competition among potential hosts, FIFA would lose its leverage. So FIFA changed its policy of continental rotation. Henceforth the new policy held that countries that were members of the same continental confederation as either of the last two World Cup hosts would be ineligible.”

Экономический бум и преображение по итогам проведения? Рассматривались кратко-, средне- и долгосрочные эффекты.

“19 исследований вопроса (2002-2013 гг.) представили the findings on the economic impact of hosting the Olympics or World Cup.
The results of these studies can be summarized as follows (some studies cover more than one mega-event): in sixteen cases, the games were found to have no statistically significant effect on employment or income, in seven cases a modest positive effect on income or short-run employment was found, and in three cases a negative effect on income was found. Where there was a modest short-term positive employment effect, it was in each case a fraction of the officially projected effect and must be measured against the large public investment in all cases, except Los Angeles, where public funding was diminutive.”
Цена проведения:

Участие в процедуре отбора на Олимпиаду — 100 млн долларов в среднем.

Церемонии открытия и закрытия:
“to promote local history, culture, and beauty—their main shot at creating an enticing image of their city or country and attracting worldwide tourism for years to come. Accordingly, they spend lavishly. China, for instance, reportedly spent $343 million (in 2014 prices) on its opening ceremony.”

Спортобъекты и неспортивная инфраструктура:
“these days running between roughly $5 billion and $50 billion (although the strange 2022 World Cup in Qatar may go well over $200 billion).”

“One of the problems facing developing economies when they host mega-events is that their existing transportation, communications, lodging, entertainment, and sports infrastructure is lacking. Thus, the amount of investment necessary to properly host a mega-event is extraordinary. Beijing spent more than $40 billion in preparation for the 2008 Summer Games. Brazil reportedly spent between $15 billion and $20 billion to host the 2014 World Cup. Sochi spent more than $50 billion to host the 2014 Winter Games. And Rio's cost to host the 2016 Summer Olympics is expected to approach $20 billion”

Неизбывные проблемы с отставанием строек приводят к эффекту домино с кучей негативных последствий:

“…cities and countries invariably fall behind in their construction schedule—because of political encumbrances, or deficient planning or sloppy administration, or bad weather, or labor disputes. As hosts fall behind their timetable, construction must be rushed. This leads to relaxed bidding rules, which raises prices, and to premium prices demanded by construction companies for quick delivery (which often also leads to inferior workmanship and higher maintenance costs down the road).”

Перерасход заявленных средств
Источники: E. Cottle, ed., South Africa's World Cup: A Legacy for Whom? (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011), and P. Alegi and C. Bolsmann, eds., Africa's World Cup (University of Michigan Press, 2013). Interestingly, the Commonwealth Games in India in 2010 were initially budgeted at $250 million. Business Today magazine estimated the final cost at $9.2 billion. If these numbers are accurate, then the overrun was on the order of 36 times! See Nalin Mehta and Boria Majumdar, “For a Monsoon Wedding: Delhi and the Commonwealth Games,” in International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, ed. Wolfgang Maennig and Andrew S. Zimbalist (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2012).

“Finally, ex ante promotional studies leave out a vital economic element—how the games are paid for. If a government borrows $10 billion at 5 percent over a thirty-year period, then its yearly costs of financing that loan are $651 million for thirty years. To pay for this debt service, the government must either raise taxes or reduce government services, either of which would introduce a drag on the local economy. This drag too must be seen as part of the cost of the games.”

Улучшение узнаваемости города?

“Did viewers have a better impression of Mexico after the 1968 Summer Games, which were preceded by the killing of more than 200 student demonstrators by the military, followed by the political protests of U.S. black athletes—and all of this occurring against the background of broadcasters’ repeated assertions of terrible air pollution?”
“Calgary as the host in 1988, there was also a rapid drop-off in awareness by 1989, just one year later.”

“One of the more telling arguments made by the ETOA is that Olympic and World Cup fans visit the host country to watch the sporting competitions rather than to enjoy the country's lasting tourist attractions. When sports fans went to London in 2012, for instance, they didn't go to the theater, to concert venues, to the Tate Gallery, to the British Museum, to Buckingham Palace, or to Hyde Park. They went to East London for the competitions. When they returned home, they might have described the excitement of the games to their friends, relatives, and neighbors, but the games are ephemeral, and no future tourist will go to London in 2015 because there were exciting games in 2012. And while Olympic fans may have had little or nothing to say about the enduring virtues of visiting London, they likely did have something to say about high-priced hotels and restaurants and endless traffic jams.”
“post Olympic blight (экономический спад) was common to all the cities that hosted the Games since Seoul.”

Как оценки туристической посещаемости постоянно оказываются пальцем в небо:

“This plays out in real life: tourism in Beijing fell during the 2008 Summer Games, as it did in London during the 2012 Olympics. That is, even counting the athletes, the media, the administrators, and the Olympic tourists, the total number of visitors to these cities fell during the month of the Olympic Games. Further, some local residents may have the same impulse that foreigners have: they believe their city or country will be excessively crowded and expensive during the mega-event and that the period of the competition would be a good time to take a vacation outside the country. The amount of outbound tourism from China grew by 12 percent in 2008, the year China hosted the Summer Olympics.”

“In another example, the number of foreign tourists visiting China in 2008 was 24.3 million, or 6.8 percent fewer than the 26.1 million who visited in 2007. Beijing received 30 percent fewer foreign arrivals in August 2008 than in August 2007, and the number of hotel bed nights in the city dropped 39 percent during the games compared to a year earlier. Beijing had anticipated 400,000 foreign visitors per night during the Olympics, but the actual number was 235,000.
China is not the only host country to forecast the number of foreign tourists overly optimistically. Sydney anticipated 132,000 foreign visitors daily but received only 97,000. Athens expected 105,000 per night but received only 14,000. According to the European Tour Operators Association, the problem is universal: “No city has yet predicted with any accuracy the number of people who attend.”
For the London games, the U.K.'s Office for National Statistics reported that in July and August 2012, there was a net decrease in overseas visitors to the United Kingdom of 6.1 percent relative to the number in July and August 2011 (from 6.57 million visitors in 2011 to 6.17 million in 2012). In Salt Lake City, the number[…]”
“Sydney increased its stock of hotel rooms by 30 percent to accommodate expected Olympic travelers. By the end of 2004, ten of the city's major hotels had closed”

“International arrivals in Sydney went from 2.7 million visitors in 2000 to 2.6 million in 2001, 2.4 million in 2002, and 2.3 million in 2003.”
В то же время в соседней стране всё было наоборот:“foreign arrivals to New Zealand grew each year, increasing by 17 percent between 2000 and 2003.”

Поступления от реализации билетов на Чемпионат мира — вы их не увидите, все продажи только через сайт ФИФА. :
“When Brazilians paid for tickets to the tournament, this money went to FIFA—it left the local economy. Total ticket sales for the 2014 World Cup competition were around $350 million, suggesting that over $200 million that would otherwise have contributed to domestic demand in Brazil did not do so.”

Торговля & инвестиции

Предполагалось, что косвенным эффектом от мероприятий, тем не менее сулящим вполне осязаемые барыши стала бы демонстрация открытости, в т.ч. торговле. Увы, когда сравнили похожие страны-организаторы, то выяснилось, что эффекта нет и в помине:

“When Maennig and Richter corrected for this bias by using only structurally similar countries, they found that the positive trade-signaling effect completely disappeared. Thus, we are left without any empirical evidence to confirm the touted benefit.”

Кроме того Олимпиады связаны с 10% увеличением в уровне преступности.
“the Olympics are associated with a 10 percent increase in crime rates.”

Улучшения в инфраструктуре, остающиеся после мероприятий?:

“In the case of Brazil in 2014, the government's PR boasted of the BRT transportation system that was created in several cities. This system consisted of special lanes for rapid transit buses. At best, BRT connected airports with World Cup (or future Olympic) venues, but it did little or nothing to ameliorate the woeful inadequacy of public transportation for the Brazilian people in Rio, São Paulo, and other cities.”

“The question is not whether there is a trace element of pro-development activity. Rather, the questions are: why couldn't these positive investments have been made without hosting the games, and why was it necessary to spend tens of billions of dollars to host the event in order to get several hundred million dollars, or even a billion or more dollars, of worthwhile infrastructural investments?”

"Спортивные объекты-то останутся нам на пользу":

When specialized facilities are built for an event that lasts seventeen to thirty-four days, it is perhaps unavoidable that some of these facilities will not be effectively used when the event is over. When they are not utilized or are underutilized, they will still cost money to maintain and operate. The long-term costs in these cases involve the operating and maintenance fees going forward, the debt service on the loans that were issued to finance the original construction, and the opportunity cost of the land on which the facility sits. Such under-or unutilized facilities are commonly referred to as white elephants. They seem to pop up ubiquitously after sport mega-events.”

“In addition to appropriate infrastructure, tax preferences, and various hospitality services, FIFA requires the host country to have eight modern stadiums, each with a minimum capacity of 40,000, to include one stadium for the opening match with at least 60,000 seats and another for the finals of 80,000 capacity. Without the proper stadium infrastructure, South Africa was obligated to build eight new or renovated stadiums, but ended up building ten and spending $5–$6 billion to host the World Cup finals. In 2002, South Korea reportedly spent $2.5 billion and Japan $5 billion. In contrast, with adequate facilities already in place, Germany (2006), the United States (1994), and France (1998) each spent under $1 billion. As we shall see, the same countries that have to invest substantial sums in modern, new stadiums are also likely to be the ones that find little economically viable use for these facilities after the World Cup is over.”

“Of the twenty stadiums that were built or remodeled for the 2002 World Cup, held jointly in Japan and South Korea, a majority have fallen into disuse. Vancouver's Olympic Village was taken over by the city because the developer defaulted on its loans. A large number of its units remained unsold in early 2014, and the city projected a loss of $300 million on the project.
The South African Premier Soccer League averages only 7,500 fans per match. The Cape Town stadium for the 2010 World Cup was originally to be built in the working-class community of Athlone, with plans for extensive investment to modernize the area's infrastructure. At FIFA's insistence, the new stadium was moved to Green Point, a white, affluent community on the waterfront, at a huge cost.”

“If finding long-term tenants for soccer stadiums and residential units is difficult, then one can only imagine the challenge in finding uses for lesser-used and more obscure venues such as velodromes, whitewater canoe/kayak runs, beach volleyball stadiums, speedskating ovals, and bobsled tracks.”
“Further, when used after the games, the stadiums, ski slopes, golf courses, and road networks are more likely to serve the consumption habits of upper-income groups. Hosting sports mega-events, then, tends to reinforce the existing power structure and patterns of inequality.”
и, как следствие, вышеупомянутого —

Занятия спортом нации — популяризация ЗОЖ:

“No host country has yet been able to demonstrate a direct benefit from the Olympic Games in the form of a lasting increase in participation [in sports].”

“The perennial claims that hosting the Olympics or the World Cup is an engine of economic development find little corroboration in independent studies. In the short run, the increasingly massive costs of hosting cannot come close to being matched by the modest revenues that are brought in by the games. The payoff, if there is one, must be realized in the long run. But even the legacy return is at best dubious. Much of the alleged legacy comes in the form of qualitative gains, and the rest comes over very long periods of time, difficult to trace back to the several-week period of the games or the prior construction. But more often than not, the main legacy consists of white elephants that cost billions to build and millions annually to maintain, along with mountains of debt that must be paid back over ten to thirty years.”

“In either democratic or authoritarian countries, the tendency is for event planning to hew closely to the interests of the local business elite. Construction companies, their unions (if there are any), insurance companies, architectural firms, media companies, investment bankers (who float the bonds), lawyers, and perhaps some hotel or restaurant interests get behind the Olympic or World Cup project. All stand to gain handsomely from the massive public funding. Typically, these interests hijack the local organizing committee, hire an obliging consulting firm to conduct an ersatz economic impact study, understate the costs, overstate the revenues, and go on to procure political consent.”

Будущее "Большого цирка":

“a report commissioned by the Dutch government in 2012 predicted that in the future, it was likely that only nondemocratic countries would host the Olympics because only they would have the centralized power and money to organize them.”(http://www.dezeen.com/2012/08/01/democracies-find-it-very-difficult-to-host-games-say-authors-of-olympic-cities-book/)

Вся риторика о борьбе за снижение стоимости проведения Игр была похерена при выборах столицы следующих, пройдущих в 2020:

The IOC's selection in September 2013 of Tokyo over Madrid (and Istanbul) to host the 2020 Summer Games raises questions about the constituency for real reform. Madrid's bid anticipated extensive use of existing sports facilities and only minor infrastructure work. Its total budget, shared by three levels of government over seven years, was only $1.9 billion, one of the lowest in modern Olympic history. Tokyo's bid budget was approximately $6 billion, including a very elaborate and lavish Olympic stadium and village (initially projected to cost $4 billion). If the IOC was interested in sending a message that it wanted to avoid fiscal excess and financial imprudence, it certainly did not manifest that desire in its selection of Tokyo.

*** Последние слова книги, полные и горечи, и надежды:
“However, just as monopolists won't surrender power voluntarily and will be inclined toward minimalist, cosmetic reform, city and country politicians will be concerned with not alienating their donors and the most powerful elements in their constituencies. They will be inclined, absent political reform, to shill for the interests of the construction, insurance, finance, and hotel industries.

In most cases, the electorate has been willing to settle for circuses and the promise of bread. When the electorate demands bread itself, as it has in Brazil, then politicians will be forced to take notice.”